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TAXATION: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S SEARCH FOR
ECONOMIC REALITY
MICHAEL R. FRIEDBERG*
LINDA KREER WIrr**
During the period from September 15, 1977 through June 1, 1978,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
eleven cases2 under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.3
Seven of these decisions involved income tax questions,4 one involved
an estate tax question, 5 and three involved questions of tax procedure.6
* Partner, Levenfeld and Kanter; Instructor, Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent
College of Law; member of the Illinois Bar, J.D., University of Chicago Law School.
** Associate, Levenfeld and Kanter, member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law.
1. The period hereinafter referred to as the last term runs from September 15, 1977 through
June 1, 1978.
2. See Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. United States, 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'g 422 F.
Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978), a9g No. 74 C
565 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 1977); Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978),
afjg 66 T.C. 1068 (1976); Asher v. United States, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1978), af'g 436 F. Supp.
22 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'gper cwram 67
T.C. 996 (1977); Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1978), affgper curiam 45 T.C.M.
(P-H) 76,355 (1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3090 (1978); Consolidated Foods Corp. v. United
States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978), afg No. 75 C 1447 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1976); Canal-Randolph
Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'gper curiam No. 73 C 702 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
23, 1976); Belt Ry. v. United States, 567 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1977), a'g in part ndrev'g in part No.
74 C 1336 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1975); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977),
af'gper curinm 66 T.C. 415 (1976); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir.
1977), aff'g 64 T.C. 154 (1975), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 914 (1978). Two other cases which dealt
tangentially with tax issues were decided by the Seventh Circuit during the last term, but will not
be discussed herein. Those cases are Sacks Bros. Loan Co. v. Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1978), affgper curiam in part and revg in part No. 77 C 140 (S.D. Ind. May 13, 1977) (state of
Indiana personal property tax question) and Ryan P. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977),
aff'g 67 T.C. 212 (1976) (tax evidence and contempt of court questions).
3.. The Internal Revenue Code will hereinafter be referred to in the text as the Code.
4. See Joint School Dist. No. I v. United States, 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978); Allied Fidel-
ity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1978); Consolidated Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978);
Canal-Randolph Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); Belt Ry. v. United States, 567
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1977). Belt Ry. will not be discussed since the case dealt with a technical issue
under Code section 281, concerning the taxation of terminal railroads, and has limited application
to taxpayers generally.
5. See Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977).
6. See Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978); Asher v. United States, 570
F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1978); Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1978). Wagner dealt
with the propriety of a seizure of a trust fund by the Commissioner in satisfaction of a federal tax
lien, and Asher dealt with the priority of a federal tax lien. These cases primarily involved ques-
tions of state law and will not be discussed or included in the analysis.
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Six of the cases arose from appeals of decisions by federal district
courts7 and five of the cases arose from appeals of decisions by the Tax
Court.8 Eight of the eleven appeals were made by the taxpayer from
adverse lower court decisions.9 With one exception,' 0 all lower court
tax decisions were affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. Seven of the
eleven Seventh Circuit tax cases were decided in favor of the Commis-
sioner." During the same period a Seventh Circuit tax decision was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. 12
The number of affirmations of lower court tax decisions by the
Seventh Circuit may well indicate the keen perception of tax issues and
the sound judgment reflected by the federal district courts and the Tax
Court. 13 The Seventh Circuit decisions during the last term also may
reflect an emerging tax philosophy of the court. Although this philoso-
phy may not yet be cohesively developed or fully articulated, most of
the Seventh Circuit cases during the last term stress an analysis of the
7. See Joint School Dist. No. I v. United States, 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978); Wagner v.
United States, 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978); Asher v. United States, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1978);
Consolidated Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978); Canal-Randolph Corp.
v. United States, 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); Belt Ry. v. United States, 567 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1977).
8. See Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978); Armantrout v.
Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978); Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1978);
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977).
9. See Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. United States, 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978); Allied Fidel-
ity Corp. v Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1978); Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1978); Consolidated Foods
Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978); Canal-Randolph Corp. v. United States, 568
F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); Belt Ry. v. United States, 567 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1977) (both the taxpayer
and the Commissioner appealed the district court's decision); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977).
10. See Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. United States, 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978). In addition,
in Belt Ry. v. United States, 567 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1977) the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court on a procedural issue.
11. See Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978); Armantrout v.
Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978); Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir.
1978); Consolidated Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978); Canal-Randolph
Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); Belt Ry. v. United States, 567 F.2d 717 (7th
Cir. 1977); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977). In addition, two
of the remaining four tax decisions involved issues of tax procedure for which the Seventh Cir-
cuit's determination depended on the appropriate interpretation of state law. See Wagner v.
United States, 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978); Asher v. United States, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1978).
[The Commissioner of Internal Revenue hereinafter will be referred to as the Commissioner.]
12. See Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978), rev"g 540 F.2d 300
(7th Cir. 1976), rev'g 405 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ill. 1975).
13. The authors do not intend to imply that they have developed empirical conclusions from
any statistical analysis of the Tax Court, district court and Seventh Circuit decisions. Although
the authors believe that the methodologies of the social sciences, including statistical analysis, can
well be applied more frequently and exactly to the study of law, the authors do not believe that a
sufficient statistical sampling exists, or that appropriate scientific techniques have been applied, to
reach any scientific conclusions in this article.
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economic substance of the underlying transactions, rather than the
form of the transactions or the specific technical rules under the Code.
Unless confronted with clearly applicable statutory standards or con-
trolling precedent to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit applied this de-
veloping philosophy not only in the decisions rendered in favor of the
Commissioner, but also in those decided in favor of the taxpayer.
WITHHOLDING OF TAX ON MEAL ALLOWANCES
On February 28, 1978 the United States Supreme Court reversed a
prior decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States.14 The
issue presented was whether employers are required to withhold taxes
on employee meal allowances.
In 1963, the tax year in question, the Central Illinois Public Serv-
ice Co. maintained a policy of providing its employees with a meal
allowance when the employee was required to travel on company busi-
ness. An employee was entitled to the allowance regardless whether he
actually expended the money. The criteria for receiving the allowance
were that the employee was traveling on company business (even if not
overnight) and was unable to go home for lunch. An employee meet-
ing these criteria need not have rendered any service to the company
during his lunch period to qualify for the allowance. The company
considered the payment mutually beneficial, since it created improved
working conditions and bolstered company morale.
The only issue before the district court, the appellate court and the
Supreme Court was whether the company should have been withhold-
ing taxes on the meal allowances. 15 The Commissioner urged the
courts to find that the payments constituted "wages" within the mean-
ing of Code section 3401(a), which in relevant part defines "wages" as
"4all remuneration. . . for services performed by an employee for his
employer . .. ."
The district court held that the meal allowances did not constitute
"wages" for purposes of the withholding statute. The court primarily
relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Royster Co. v. United States,'6 which held in part that salesmen's meal
allowances were not remuneration for services performed. The district
14. See 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
15. The issue before all three courts was not whether the lunch allowances constituted in-
come, but rather whether they constituted wages requiring withholding. The concept of "income"
is broader than the concept of "wages." See 435 U.S. at 24.
16. 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973), affg 342 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Va. 1972).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
court in Central Illinois held that since the employees were not render-
ing services to the company during the lunch hour, a necessary precon-
dition to consider meal allowances as "wages" under Code section
3401(a) was not present. The district court believed that to consider
such payments as "wages" would require "a departure from the reali-
ties of business life."' 7
In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit began its opin-
ion with the premise that such allowances constituted taxable income to
the employees.' 8 The Seventh Circuit considered the broad definition
of remuneration for employee services which had been set forth by the
Supreme Court,' 9 concluding that such remuneration must be viewed
in the context of "'not only work actually done but the entire em-
ployer-employee relationship for which compensation is paid to the
employee by the employer.' "20 Armed with the premise that the pay-
ments constituted taxable income and the broad definition of remuner-
ation arrangements, the Seventh Circuit found that remuneration for
employee services should not be viewed restrictively. 2' 'Accordingly,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the meal allowances in Central
Illinois constituted remuneration for services and thus were "wages"
for which the employer should have withheld taxes.
This decision of the Seventh Circuit reflects a probing and broad
analysis of the relevant Code section, but reaches a conclusion that to
some extent may have disregarded narrow technicalities. As a matter
of substance, if not form, the meal allowances were part of the "total
package of remuneration" paid by the employer to the employee. The
economic substance of the meal allowances coupled with an otherwise
17. 405 F. Supp. at 749.
18. 540 F.2d at 301. While this premise is now a correct interpretation of the law, the law
had not been settled at the time the Seventh Circuit rendered its decision in Central Illinois. See
435 U.S. at 24 (citing Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977)). See also Kovey, Impact of
Supreme Court Decision Limiting Withholding on Employees' Meal Allowances, 48 J. TAX. 276,
277-278 (1978).
19. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327
U.S. 358 (1946); Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1970). These three cases concluded, inter alia and with respect to various fact situations, that the
term "wages" generally must be defined to include all remuneration for employment, including
the cash value of remuneration paid in a medium other than cash.
20. 540 F.2d at 302 (quoting Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946)).
21. 540 F.2d at 302. See H.R. REp. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1939) and S. REP. No.
628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1939). The Seventh Circuit also reviewed the legislative history
behind Code section 3121 which defines "wages" for purposes of the social security tax system.
This definition of "wages" was held by the Fourth Circuit to have essentially the same meaning as
the term "wages" for purposes of the withholding of income tax provisions of the Code. Royster
Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 1973). Although the Seventh Circuit considered
Royster as precedent for certain of its premises in Central Illinois, the court did not adopt
Royster's conclusion.
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apparently illogical distinction between "income received from an em-
ployer" and "wages," led the Seventh Circuit to the logical, albeit non-
technical, conclusion that the meal reimbursements did constitute
"wages" subject to withholding.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit and determined that the payments were not "wages"
subject to the withholding of income tax. 22 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing the majority opinion 23 for the Supreme Court in Central
Illinois, primarily analyzed the Commissioner's argument which at-
tempted to impose a withholding obligation on the employer by virtue
of the income tax result to the employee. 24  The Court rejected this
reasoning and stated:
The case of course would flow in the Government's favor if the mere
fact that the reimbursements made in the context of the employer-
employee relationship were to govern the withholding tax result.
That they were so paid is obvious. But it is one thing to say that the
reimbursements constitute income to the employees for income tax
purposes, and it is quite another thing to say that it follows therefrom
that the reimbursements in 1963 were subject to withholding. There
is a gap between the premise and the conclusion and it is a wide one.
Considerations that support subjectability to the income tax are not
necessarily the same as the considerations that support withholding.
To require the employee to carry the risk of his own tax liability is
not the same as to require the employer to carry the risk of the tax
liability of its employee. Requiring withholding, therefore, is rightly
much narrower than subjectability to income taxation. 25
While the Seventh Circuit may have felt that there was no eco-
nomic reality to a distinction between "income" paid to employees and
"wages" paid to employees, the Supreme Court found distinct differ-
ences between the two concepts. The Supreme Court viewed the with-
holding tax procedure as one established for simplicity and ease of
administration, thus susceptible to objective standards. Even conced-
ing such a distinction from the income tax, the Supreme Court decision
22. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
23. No Justice specifically joined the majority opinion. However, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote
a concurring opinion with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Powell joined. Mr.
Justice Powell, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined, wrote another concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred only in the judgment.
24. The Commissioner argued that the definition of "wages" in Code section 3401(a) corre-
sponded to the first category of"gross income" set forth in Code section 6l(a)(l), and that the two
statutes had "equivalent scope." 435 U.S. at 28. The Commissioner further argued that the meal
allowance in question was compensatory because there was a direct causal relationship between
the receipt of the allowance and the performance of services by the employee, such that there was
no difference between the meal allowance and traditional wage or salary payments. In rejecting
the Commissioner's contentions, Mr. Justice Blackmun termed the Commissioner's conclusion as
"facile." Id. at 29.
25. Id.
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may be vulnerable with regard to why meal allowances themselves can-
not be considered "wages." At least theoretically, meal allowances
could be subject to objective standards giving rise to ease of adminis-
tration.26
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court decision in Central Illinois
presented a more narrow and technical reading of the underlying stat-
ute than the reading adopted by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion.
While both courts examined the policy rationales behind the statute,
the broader economic considerations may have provided, at least im-
plicitly, the underpinnings for the tax decision of the Seventh Circuit
which was reversed during the last term.
WITHHOLDING OF TAX ON RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was
guided by the reversal of Central Illinois in its decision on May 19,
1978 in Joint School District No. 1 v. United States.27 The specific issue
in Joint School District No. 1 has limited applicability to individual
taxpayers, since it involved mandatory contributions to the Wisconsin
State Teachers Retirement System. The decision illustrates that the
Seventh Circuit has restricted its analysis of economic reality and has
narrowed its definition of "wages" in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Central Illinois. In Joint School District No. 1, the Seventh
Circuit determined that contributions to a retirement fund made by an
employer in lieu of the employees' statutorily mandated contributions
did not constitute indirect wages of the employees and thus were not
subject to withholding of tax by the employer under the withholding
tax statute.2
8
The case arose from the policies of Joint School District No. 1 and
facts peculiar to Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin statutes relating to
26. In conclusion, Mr. Justice Blackmun stated: "This is not to say, of course, that the Con-
gress may not subject lunch reimbursements to withholding if in its wisdom it chooses to do so by
expanding the definition of wages for withholding. It has not done so as yet. And we cannot
justify the Government's attempt to do so by judicial determination." Id. at 33. That the fore-
going may be the real rationale for the Supreme Court's holding in CentralIllinois is supported by
the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan (with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr.
Justice Powell joined) and Mr. Justice Powell (with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined). Both
concurrences expanded upon Mr. Justice Blackmun's statement, finding that the Commissioner
abused his discretion in attempting to impose a withholding tax liability retroactively on Central
Illinois Public Service Co. and that fundamental fairness required either notice to taxpayers of the
liability or clear Congressional authorization prior to the retroactive assessment of a tax. Id at
33-38.
27. 577 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'g 422 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
28. I.R.C. § 3401.
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teacher retirement benefits 29 required that teachers contribute six per
cent of their pay to the retirement system, by way of deduction from
their paychecks, 30 and that the school district contribute four per cent.3 '
The Wisconsin Attorney General had issued an opinion 32 stating that
contributions to the retirement system by an employer in excess of its
mandatory contributions, which were made pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, could be considered as payments from the em-
ployee-teacher's compensation. The Attorney General's opinion also
stated that the statute requiring mandatory contributions merely estab-
lished that such contributions be made, regardless of whether they were
made by the teacher-employee or by the school district-employer. As
a result of the collective bargaining process between the school district
and the employee-teachers, Joint School District No. 1 withheld 3.5 per
cent of each teacher's compensation from each paycheck and paid the
remaining 2.5 per cent of each teacher's contribution from its own
funds.
In addition, Joint School District No. 1 did not report this 2.5 per
cent as wages subject to withholding of tax on its employer's quarterly
federal tax return. 33 The Commissioner disagreed with this procedure,
claiming that the taxes withheld should have been increased since the
direct payment into the retirement system by the school district consti-
tuted "wages" subject to withholding. The district court upheld the
Commissioner's finding and concluded that the payments were
"wages" since they were made "on behalf of the employees and in sat-
isfaction of the obligation imposed on the employees" 34 by the Wiscon-
sin statute.35
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, initially
noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Central Illinois established
the premise that there are differences between taxable income and
wages subject to withholding.36 Although the Seventh Circuit did not
expressly apply the reasoning of Central Illinois to this case, it perhaps
tacitly used Central Illinois for the proposition that the concept of
29. WIs. STAT. §§ 42.20-42.69 (Cum. Supp. 1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. §§ 42.20-
42.69 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
30. WIs. STAT. § 42.40(1) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 42.40(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1978)).
31. WIs. STAT. § 42.40(8) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 42.40(8) (Cum.
Supp. 1978)).
32. 59 Op. Att'y Gen. 186 (1970).
33. See I.R.C. § 6071.
34. 422 F. Supp. at 578.
35. WIs. STAT. § 42.40(1) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 42.40(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1978)).
36. 577 F.2d at 1091, 1092.
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"wages" must be construed narrowly within the language of the with-
holding statute.37 In reaching its decision in Joint School District No.
1, the court did not rely on or discuss any of the provisions of the
Code, but found that the question was one of construction of Wisconsin
law. The court found it significant that, subsequent to the tax year in
issue, both the state of Wisconsin and the federal government enacted
legislation 38 expressly providing that the "pick-up" payments on behalf
of the employees were to be treated as employer contributions39 and
that the legislative history behind the federal law indicated that the
changes were to "clarify present law." 4° Accordingly, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the "pick-up" payments were in fact employer contribu-
tions and therefore were not subject to withholding.41
One may wish to speculate whether the result here would have
been different if the Seventh Circuit had not been reversed in Central
Illinois. In Joint School District No. 1 the court expressly refused to
examine the nature of employer contributions in terms of income to the
employees 42 as it had in Central Illinois. Furthermore, the court did
not apply the broad economic analysis it utilized in Central Illinois. If
it had, the court might have determined that the amounts paid by Joint
School District No. 1 to the retirement system arose out of the employ-
ment relationship, and that the payments inured to the benefit of the
school district's employees as a consequence of their services. Al-
though it is difficult to speculate as to what would have occurred had
the Seventh Circuit not been reversed in Central Illinois, it seems clear
that in Joint School District No. 1 the Seventh Circuit shied away from
any economic analysis and narrowly construed the definition of
"wages" in determining whether the payments were subject to with-
holding.
COMPENSATION FROM EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT TRUSTS
In Central Illinois, the Seventh Circuit decided in favor of eco-
nomic reality notwithstanding a restrictive tax statute. In Joint School
District No. 1, the Seventh Circuit abandoned economic reality when
confronted with a restrictive tax statute and Supreme Court precedent.
37. I.R.C. § 3401(a).
38. See I.R.C. § 414(h); Wis. STAT. § 42.40(9) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
39. Generally, such employer contributions are not subject to withholding of income tax.
See I.R.C. § 3401(a)(12).
40. 577 F.2d at 1093 (quoting CONF. CoMM. REP. No. 93-1280, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5060).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1092. See text accompanying notes 12, 14-26, supra.
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In Armantrout v. Commissioner,43 however, economic reality appeared
more consistent with the broad precedent interpreting the tax statute
involved. In this case, the Seventh Circuit on February 10, 1978 af-
firmed per curiam a Tax Court decision and determined that distribu-
tions from an "educational benefit trust plan" constituted taxable
income to employees whose children received the benefit of payments
under the employer's plan."4 The holding in this case also reflects the
Seventh Circuit's search to discern the economic realities of the sub-
stance, and not merely the form, of the transactions in income tax con-
troversies.
Hamlin, Inc., a corporation in the electronic components business,
had established an educational benefit plan with Educo, Inc., a corpo-
ration which designed, implemented and administered college educa-
tion benefit plans for children of corporate employees. The terms of
the plan required that Hamlin make contributions to a bank as trustee.
The children of Hamlin's key employees were entitled to receive sums
from the trustee to defray their college education expenses, subject to
various limitations and procedures. An employee without children
would receive nothing directly or indirectly under the plan, including
no adjustment in compensation. Three of the children of Richard T.
Armantrout, a corporate executive employed by Hamlin, received edu-
cational expenses from the trustee in accordance with the plan. The
Armantrouts did not report these amounts as income on their 1971,
1972, and 1973 federal income tax returns.
The Commissioner determined that the amounts distributed by the
Educo Trust to Armantrout's children were scholarships which were
directly related to Armantrout's employment. As such, the scholar-
ships were a part of Armantrout's compensation and includable in his
gross income. In support of this argument, the Commissioner cited
Code section 61, which in relevant part defines gross income as "all
income from whatever sources derived," including "compensation for
services." 45 The Commissioner further buttressed his argument by ref-
erence to Code section 83, which generally states that where property is
transferred to any person other than the person for whom the services
are performed, the performer of the services must pay income tax on
43. 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978), a/fgper curiam 67 T.C. 996 (1977).
44. In addition, the Commissioner has issued a revenue ruling that the scholarships in
Armantrout constituted "wages" subject inter alia to income tax withholding. See Rev. Rul. 78-
184, 1978-20 I.R.B. 19. But see Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978),
rev'g 540 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'g 405 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. 11. 1975).
45. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
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these amounts.46
The taxpayer argued that, while amounts distributed by the Educo
Trust were perhaps "generated" by his efforts as an employee of Ham-
lin, such amounts did not constitute gross income to him.47 According
to the taxpayer, the Educo plan distributions were not beneficially re-
ceived by him, he did not have the right to receive such distributions
and he did not possess any "ownership" or "control" interest in the
amounts.48 Without such constructive receipt or interest in the funds,
the taxpayer-employee argued that according to the various "assign-
ment of income" precedents the distributions could not constitute in-
come to him.49
In a per curiam decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Commis-
sioner's position. The opinion cited United States v. Basye50 for the
principle that one who earns income may not avoid taxation through
anticipatory arrangements. Then, with the force of logic but perhaps
less precedent, the court concluded that the amounts paid for the edu-
cation of an employee's children were compensatory in nature because
the "'plan was adopted by Hamlin to relieve its most important em-
ployees from concern about the high cost of providing a college educa-
tion for their children.' ,51 The opinion further stated that the
corporate employees had some degree of control over the manner in
which they were compensated 52 and that it was immaterial that the
46. I.R.C. § 83(a) (these amounts are calculated pursuant to Code section 402(b)).
47. 67 T.C. at 1002. It appears questionable, as both a matter of law and fact, whether the
taxpayer had to make this concession.
#8. Id.
49. Id. at 1005. See Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) and
Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962). In these cases the courts held that the taxpayers
who did not actually receive the income in question, and were prevented from obtaining actual
receipt without action on their part, did not possess sufficient dominion and control over the in-
come to be taxed thereon.
50. 410 U.S. 441 (1973). In Basye, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether
partners could escape income taxes by having their partnership enter into an agreement which
placed the partnership income out of their reach. However, query whether the holding in Basye
applies to a corporate employee who is not a shareholder and who does not enter into any agree-
ment to place either the corporate income or his own income from the corporation out of his
reach.
51. 570 F.2d at 212 (quoting 67 T.C. 996, 1004 (1977)). The authors question whether "relief
from concern" is too subjective to constitute an economic benefit giving rise to taxation; or, if
"relief from concern" does constitute an economic benefit, whether it has an ascertainable value.
However, if the Seventh Circuit actually meant to refer to a relief from the taxpayer's legal obliga-
tion of support, which would constitute an economic benefit of presumably ascertainable value,
the court should not have considered this argument in reaching its decision. The Commissioner,
prior to the taxpayer's appeal in Armantrout, withdrew his alternative argument that the amounts
distributed by Educo discharged the taxpayer's legal obligations to support his children. Appar-
ently, Armantrout was not so obligated or at least the Commissioner was reluctant to raise the
issue in this case.
52. 570 F.2d at 213. It appears dubious whether any of Hamlin's employees could have
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payments were never received by the employees since "the first princi-
ple of income taxation [is] that income must be taxed to him who earns
it."553
As a matter of economic analysis, relieving employees from the
burden of paying educational expenses of dependents does provide a
financial benefit that only arises by virtue of the employment relation-
ship. When considering Code section 61, which contains an extremely
broad definition of income, 54 the economic realities of Armantrout fall
squarely in line with the position asserted by the Commissioner.
It is surprising, however, that the opinion of the Seventh Circuit
did not probe more deeply into the technical issues involved. The
court did not extensively discuss the argument raised by the taxpayer
that the assignment of income doctrine is not applicable in a situation
where no amounts are received by the taxpayer nor is the right to re-
ceive or control the payment of such amounts vested in the taxpayer.55
While the decision of the Seventh Circuit in this case may be techni-
cally correct, it is perhaps incomplete.
It also is interesting that the opinion of the Seventh Circuit states
near its conclusion that: "To hold otherwise would foster easy tax eva-
sion .... ,,56 While this standard is not aper se criterion for deciding
tax cases, it appears that the court did place some reliance on the prac-
tical effects of its holding. However, tax evasion, as distinguished from
tax avoidance, generally refers to criminal, and not civil, tax issues.57
individually negotiated the terms of his employment arrangement, other than by not accepting an
initial offer of employment or by terminating his employment. Whether terminating one's em-
ployment by itself constitutes sufficient control over his employment arrangement, at least in other
areas of federal taxation, is questionable. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-334, 1968-1 C.B. 403 (the right to
cancel group insurance coverage by terminating employment is not an "incident of ownership"
with respect to that insurance under Code section 2042). But cf Commissioner v. Treganowan,
183 F.2d 288 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub. nonL., Estate of Strauss v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 853
(1950) (owning a seat on the New York Stock Exchange constitutes an "incident of ownership"
over the exchange's "gratuity fund" death benefit, since the owner could sell his exchange seat).
53. 570 F.2d at 213 (quoting Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949)).
54. See text accompanying note 45, supra.
55. See Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972); Teschner v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962). The Seventh Circuit did not discuss these cases relied on by the
taxpayer and thereby left their precedential value, at least in the Seventh Circuit, in some doubt;
however, the Seventh Circuit in its per curiam opinion at least tacitly accepted the Tax Court's
decision. While not discussing in any detail the taxpayer's most compelling argument, the Sev-
enth Circuit did note that it had considered numerous authorities not contained in the taxpayer's
brief and found them "inapposite" to the facts at hand. 570 F.2d at 213. See also Teschner, The
First E45ucatonal Benefit Trust Case, 56 TAXEs 255, 263 (1978), where Mr. Teschner, the tax-
payer's counsel in Armantroza, criticized the courts' decisions, claiming in part that the decisions
relied on what the record did not show rather than what it did show.
56. 570 F.2d at 213.
57. See, ag., H.G. BATER, TAX FRAUD AND EvAsION at 1 2.03 (4th ed. 1976) (citing Mr.
Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1916)).
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The use of such broad reasoning in a technical area and within the
context of civil litigation may underscore the Seventh Circuit's non-
technical approach to tax cases when the court attempts to discern eco-
nomic reality.
INCORPORATION EXPENSES AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS
In Canal-Randolph Corp. v. United States,58 the Seventh Circuit on
December 16, 1977 issued aper curiam opinion affirming the decision
of the district court. The case dealt with two separate situations, the
first involving the deductibility of incorporation expenses and the sec-
ond involving the nature of income received in settlement of litigation.
While neither issue was novel nor universal, the opinions of the Sev-
enth Circuit on both issues reflect an analysis of the substantive reah-
ties involved.
The first issue stemmed from a dispute concerning the tax conse-
quences of a merger between the taxpayer, Canal-Randolph Corp., and
United Stockyards Corp. In 1964, United entered into a merger agree-
ment with Canal-Randolph Corp. Pursuant to the terms of the merger
agreement, United organized UST Corp. and transferred all of its as-
sets and liabilities to UST in exchange for all of UST's stock. On the
effective date of the merger, Canal-Randolph acquired all of the stock
of UST, as successor to United, and thus effectively (if not technically)
merged with United and became the surviving corporation to the
merger.
The second issue stemmed from the business activities of United
prior to the merger. In 1904, Fort Worth Stockyards Corp., Armour &
Co. and Swift & Co. entered into an agreement which provided in part
that all animals slaughtered on Armour's and Swift's premises were to
pass through Fort Worth's stockyards. In addition, Armour and Swift
were to pay Fort Worth the customary yardage and other stockyard
charges. In 1936, United acquired two-thirds of the assets of Fort
Worth and in 1944 it acquired the remainder. In 1958, Armour and
Swift allegedly discontinued the use of Fort Worth's stockyards and
discontinued the payments.59 United, as transferee of Fort Worth's as-
sets, instituted a lawsuit against Armour and Swift for breach of the
agreement. The lawsuit was dismissed after the parties entered into
settlement agreements. These agreements provided in relevant part
that Armour and Swift would make reduced yardage payments to
58. 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977), a.rf'gper curiam No. 73 C 702 (N.D. I11. Dec. 23, 1976).
59. Id. at 30.
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United whenever Armour or Swift brought animals into their packing
plants without passing them through United's stockyards.
The first issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether the expenses
incurred by United in connection with its 1936 incorporation were fully
deductible under Code section 165 as a "loss sustained during the taxa-
ble year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise .- 60 at
the time of the 1964 merger between Canal-Randolph and United.6'
The Seventh Circuit initially noted the rule that, upon dissolution or
liquidation of a corporation, capital expenditures incurred before 1954
would be deductible because they no longer were of any value to the
business being liquidated. 62 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court decision holding that the organizational ex-
penditures were not deductible by Canal-Randolph. To reach this
holding, the Seventh Circuit relied on Vulcan Materials Co. v. United
States,63 which stated: " 'These assets were not lost but were continued
beyond the corporate existence of the constituent corporations and per-
sisted as capital assets of the surviving corporation. So construed, the
expenses were not deductible.' "64 The court concluded that since
United had become a subsidiary of Canal-Randolph by merger, there
was no uncompensated loss to Canal-Randolph by virtue of expendi-
tures incurred in organizing United.
The Seventh Circuit then distinguished this case from Dragon Ce-
ment Co. v. United States.65 In Dragon Cement, the surviving corpora-
tion to the merger was permitted a current deduction for a fee paid to
Pennsylvania which the merged corporation also had made. The Sev-
enth Circuit distinguished Dragon Cement on the ground that the ini-
tial payment to the state in fact had been "lost" by virtue of the
required second payment and accordingly constituted an uncompen-
sated loss which was deductible for federal income tax purposes. Fur-
thermore, the Seventh Circuit refused to recharacterize the merger of
United and Canal-Randolph as a dissolution for which the payment
presumably would have been "lost." The court noted that Canal-Ran-
60. I.R.C. § 165(a).
61. Code section 248 specifically provides that post-1954 organizational expenditures may be
deducted from taxable income ratably over a period of more than five years upon election by the
taxpayer. However, this section was inapplicable to the taxpayer since United had incorporated
in 1936. Accordingly, any loss available to Canal-Randolph Corp. by virtue of its merger with
United would be available as a deduction only if Code section 165(a) were applicable. See I.R.C.
§ 248.
62. 568 F.2d at 31.
63. 446 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971).
64. 446 F.2d at 694-95, quoted in 568 F.2d at 31.
65. 144 F. Supp. 188 (D. Me. 1956), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 244 F.2d 513 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957).
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dolph had structured the merger in the manner it had in order to con-
summate the transaction as a tax-free reorganization.66 That the assets
of United had been transferred to UST prior to the merger was consid-
ered irrelevant, since the "taxpayer acquired the stock of that subsidi-
ary in the merger just as it would have acquired United's generating
assets had they remained in United. '67
The second issue in Canal-Randolph Corp. involved a determina-
tion of whether the settlement payments received by the taxpayer from
Swift and Armour constituted ordinary income or capital gain in-
come.68 In affirming the district court's determination that the settle-
ment payments were ordinary income, the Seventh Circuit relied on
several cases69 in holding that "the . . . tax classification of settled
amounts is determined by reference to the nature of the claim set-
tled."' 70 Since the suit instituted by United against Swift and Armour
concerned an alleged breach of contract for the payment of yardage
and other stockyard fees to Fort Worth and its successors in payment
for allegedly required stockyard services, the fees themselves would
have been ordinary income to Fort Worth and its successors when re-
ceived. Accordingly, the settlement payments also were characterized
as ordinary income. 7'
66. See generally I.R.C. § 368. However, even if the merger were planned as a "tax-free
reorganization," it should not follow that the taxpayer not be allowed the deduction because of the
"tax-free" character of the acquisition.
67. 568 F.2d at 32.
68. "Capital gains" occur for federal tax purposes upon the disposition of a "capital asset" at
a profit, which is defined in Code section 1221. "Capital assets" generally include property held
by a taxpayer exclusive of stock in trade, inventory, depreciable property, real property used in a
trade or business, business accounts receivable and notes receivable, and obligations of the United
States. See I.R.C. § 1221. Under Code section 1201, the disposition of a "capital asset" after
1978 by a corporate taxpayer will generally result in the imposition of a tax of twenty-eight per
cent of the net "capital gain." See I.R.C. § 1221 (as amended). On the other hand, Code section
11 provides that with respect to "ordinary" (iLe., non-capital) income, for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1978 a corporation is subject to federal income tax at graduated rates ranging
from seventeen per cent to forty-six per cent on amounts of taxable income in excess of $100,000.
Thus, capital gains generally are taxed at reduced rates for corporate taxpayers.
69. Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1973); and Anchor
Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
70. 568 F.2d at 33.
71. It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit reached its conclusion for a different
reason than that utilized by the district court. The district court held that the settlement payments
were ordinary income because Ft. Worth had retained an interest in the land purchased by Ar-
mour and Swift, which was in return for the agreement that all animals slaughtered on the trans-
ferred land would pass through Ft. Worth's stockyards with all customary charges paid. As a
consequence, the district court concluded that Ft. Worth and its successors had retained "a contin-
uing economic interest in the transferred property," which meant that the settlement payments
were part of the "continuing economic interest" and constituted ordinary income. See Canal-
Randolph v. United States, No. 73 C 702 (N.D. I11. Dec. 23, 1976) (77-1 U.S.T.C. 9158 at
86,228). The Seventh Circuit dismissed this reasoning as a basis for its decision and considered
the real economic effect of the arrangement to be that Ft. Worth would receive payment for the
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ROYALTY PAYMENTS: ORDINARY OR CAPITAL GAIN INCOME
On January 11, 1978 the Seventh Circuit in Consolidated Foods
Corp. v. United States72 affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the government. Consistent with the other tax
cases before the Seventh Circuit during the last term, the Consolidated
Foods decision reflects the court's probing of the realities of the busi-
ness relationships rather than the technical form of the transaction.
Consolidated Foods Corp., the taxpayer, was the successor to
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc.73 In 1963, Sara Lee U.S. entered into an
agreement with Kitchens of Sara Lee (Canada) Ltd.,74 a wholly owned
subsidiary of Consolidated Foods. Pursuant to the agreement, which
was termed a "license agreement," Sara Lee U.S. transferred to Sara
Lee Canada the exclusive and perpetual use in Canada of its Canadian
licensed trademark "Sara Lee." Sara Lee U.S. retained certain rights,
including the right to maintain product quality standards, the right to
prohibit sub-licensing without prior consent and the right to legal title
to the trademark. In exchange for the grant of the trademark to Sara
Lee Canada, Sara Lee U.S. was to receive royalties based on the net
sales of products sold by Sara Lee Canada under the trademark. The
"license agreement" was of perpetual duration, but it could be termi-
nated by Sara Lee U.S. upon Sara Lee Canada's insolvency or default.
Sara Lee U.S. reported the payments that it received from Sara
Lee Canada under the agreement as long-term capital gain75 on its
United States corporate income tax returns for the years 1965 through
1971. The Commissioner determined that the payments constituted
ordinary income and accordingly assessed income tax deficiencies.
Sara Lee U.S. paid the additional tax assessments and then filed a re-
fund suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois.
The district court found that the trademark in question was itself a
capital asset.76 Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the al-
leged "sale" was a "royalty" paid pursuant to a license agreement. A
"royalty" paid for the use of a capital asset, unlike the income from the
stockyard services it actually rendered. The Seventh Circuit also disregarded the district court's
alternative reasoning that the payments must be ordinary income because the taxpayer failed to
carry its burden of designating what portions of the payments were capital gains. See generally
568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977).
72. 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978), affg No. 75 C 1447 (N.D. Il. Nov. 9, 1976).
73. Hereinafter referred to as Sarah Lee U.S.
74. Hereinafter referred to as Sarah Lee Canada.
75. See I.R.C. § 1222(3).
76. See No. 75 C 1447 (N.D. Il. Nov. 9, 1976) (relying on Rev. Rul. 55-694, 1955-2 C.B.
299). See also note 68, supra.
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sale of the asset, creates ordinary income rather than capital gain in-
come to the recipient.77  The district court found that Sara Lee U.S.
had not met the burden of showing that the transaction constituted the
sale of a capital asset, since the "license agreement" failed to provide
for the sale of the trademark at a price payable in money or its
equivalent78 and did not reflect a transfer of all Sara Lee U.S.'s interest
in the asset.79
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the issue was a "thorny one" which the courts had not con-
sistently resolved.80 The opinion noted that, as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969,81 Congress enacted Code section 1253 in order to set forth
clear standards on how restrictive an agreement can be with respect to
the retention of proprietary rights by the transferor but constitute a
"sale" rather than a "license. ' 82 However, Code section 1253 did not
77. See I.R.C. § 1253(c).
78. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
79. See Moberg v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1966); Estate of Gowdey v. Com-
missioner, 307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962) (sale of asset is evidenced by the transfer of all of seller's
interest in the asset).
80. 569 F.2d at 437.
81. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
82. I.R.C. § 1253(a), (b) and (c), as enacted in 1969, reads as follows:
(a) General rule
A transfer of a franchise, trademark, or trade name shall not be treated as a sale or
exchange of a capital asset if the transferor retains any significant power, right, or contin-
uing interest with respect to the subject matter of the franchise, trademark, or trade
name.
(b) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) Franchise
The term "franchise" includes an agreement which gives one of the parties to
the agreement the right to distribute, sell, or provide goods, services, or facilities,
within a specified area.
(2) Significant power, right, or continuing interest
The term "significant power, right, or continuing interest" includes, but is not
limited to, the following rights with respect to the interest transferred:
(A) A right to disapprove any assignment of such interest, or any part thereof.
(B) A right to terminate at will.
(C) A riht to prescribe the standards of quality of products used or sold, or of
services furnished, and of the equipment and facilities used to promote such prod-
ucts or services.(D) A right to require that the transferee sell or advertise only products or
services of the transferor.
(E) A right to require that the transferee purchase substantially all of his sup-
plies and equipment from the transferor.(F) A right to payments contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of
the subject matter of the interest transferred, if such payments constitute a substan-
tial element under the transfer agreement.
(3) Transfer
The term "transfer" includes the renewal of a franchise, trademark, or trade
name.
(c) Treatment of contingent payments by transferor
Amounts received or accrued on account of a transfer, sale, or other disposition of a
franchise, trademark, or trade name which are contingent on theproductivity, use, or
disposition of the franchise, trademark, or trade name transferred shall be treated as
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codify existing case law and applied only to transfers made after De-
cember 31, 1969.83 Since the initial transfer in question took place in
1963, the Seventh Circuit was required to analyze the unsettled case
law.
After an extensive analysis of a series of cases in several other cir-
cuits involving the tax treatment of various Dairy Queen franchise
agreements, 84 the Seventh Circuit noted that the Sara Lee agreement
was similar to the agreements in the Dairy Queen cases. All of the
cases involved the transfer of an exclusive right to use a patent, the
retention of quality control powers, payments computed by reference to
the amount of products sold by the transferee, the use of the terms "li-
cense" and "royalties," and possession by the transferor of the right to
terminate the agreement upon default by the transferee.
However, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a salient difference
existed between the Sara Lee agreement and the Dairy Queen agree-
ments; in the Sara Lee agreement the royalty payments were the only
form of consideration. In examining the various factors distinguishing
a "license" from a "sale," the Seventh Circuit noted .that since the only
form of monetary consideration passing from Sara Lee Canada to Sara
Lee U.S. was the royalty payments, treatment of the royalty payments
as something other than consideration for the transfer of a right to use
a trademark was precluded. Coupled with the fact that the agreement
was entitled "license agreement" and that Sara Lee Canada deducted
the payments as business expenses on its Canadian income tax return,85
the payments received by Sara Lee U.S. were held to constitute ordi-
nary income as royalties and not capital gains stemming from the sale
of a trademark.
The Seventh Circuit thus established its own position, declining to
adopt the position of any of the conflicting circuit courts of appeals
decisions, "because we do not believe that the royalty arrangement
should be analyzed separately from the other provisions of the agree-
amounts received or accrued from the sale or other disposition of property which is not a
capital asset.
83. 569 F.2d at 438.
84. See Moberg v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Wernentin,
354 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1965); Moberg v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962); Estate of
Gowdey v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962); Moberg v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 800
(5th Cir. 1962) and Dairy Queen of Okla., Inc. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1957).
85. It appears that the taxpayer was attempting to have the best of all possible worlds: the
payments by Sara Lee Canada were considered by the taxpayer as royalties deductible against its
Canadian income, but the payments received by Sara Lee U.S. were reported as long term capital
gain for United States tax purposes. Although the Seventh Circuit noted this difference, it said:
"[We do not suggest that the tax treatment of a transaction by a foreign country should primarily
control our characterization of the agreement for United States tax purposes, but we do take
notice of this conduct as reflecting some light upon the intent of the parties." 569 F.2d at 442.
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ment, especially if, as here, the royalties are the only form of monetary
consideration. '8 6 Rather than establish a hard technical rule, the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that each case in this area must be decided on
its particular facts.87
TAX ACCOUNTING AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES
On September 28, 1977 the Seventh Circuit affirmed an important
Tax Court decision in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner.88 The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the plaintiff.89
The issue in this case was whether the Commissioner has the authority
to determine that an accounting practice fails to clearly reflect the tax-
payer's income, even though the particular accounting practice utilized
is "generally accepted" as a "best accounting practice." 9 The issue in
Thor, at least in a general sense, related to the fundamental question
whether commonly utilized accounting procedures are sufficient to re-
flect economic reality for tax reporting purposes. 91 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision indicates, however, the issue was narrowed to whether the
Commissioner had reasonably exercised his discretion in determining
that the accounting methods chosen by the taxpayer did not clearly re-
flect its income.
The case arose from the accounting practices of Thor Power Tool
Co., a manufacturer of tools and tool parts. When Thor discontinued
the manufacture of tools of a particular model, it continued to maintain
an inventory of stock replacement parts and accessories. In 1964, Thor
established a procedure for "writing down" the value of this inventory
after determining that the number of parts on hand exceeded future
demand.
In 1960, Thor established an inventory contra account92 in order to
86. 569 F.2d at 441.
87. Id. The Seventh Circuit's refusal to apply mechanical rules without detailed examina-
tion of the transactions at issue further illustrates the emphasis that the court places on such reali-
ties and its refusal to apply automatically "black letter" law.
88. 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977), af'g 64 T.C. 154 (1975), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
89. 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
90. 563 F.2d at 866.
91. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in 1973, established the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as successor to the Accounting Principles Board, to
promulgate "financial accounting standards." The purpose of FASB is to standardize the
financial accounting field with rules that result in the most accurate picture of the financial posi-
tion of a company. See 3 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) §§ 510.08, 520.01.
92. "A contra account is an account that reduces either an asset or liability on a balance
sheet." D.E. Kiwso & J. J. WEYOANDT, INTERMEDIATE AccouNTINo 178 (1974). The use of an
inventory contra account allows the balance sheet user to see the original cost of the inventory and
the reductions therein to date. See id.
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reduce the book value of replacement parts and accessories for discon-
tinued tools. These parts and accessories were amortized over a ten
year period as was reflected in the credit entries to the contra account.
The credit balance in this account at the end of each year was shown on
Thor's federal income tax return as a reduction of closing inventory.
Thus, the net addition to this account during a taxable year increased
Thor's cost of goods sold and reduced its taxable income for that year.
Furthermore, in connection with the preparation of Thor's 1964
financial statements, a complete physical inventory was taken. Thor's
management concluded that existing inventory quantities were in ex-
cess of anticipated market demand. Accordingly, Thor's management
adjusted its inventory valuations "in order to show inventory at its 'net
realizable value,' as required by the standards of the accounting profes-
sion, and to value the inventory at 'the lower of cost or market' as had
been Thor's practice for income tax purposes. ' 93 Much of the inven-
tory for replacement parts and accessories with respect to discontinued
products was "written down" to reflect obsolescence. The remaining
inventory also was evaluated for the purpose of ascertaining the extent
to which it was in excess of estimated demand. The Commissioner did
not oppose the write down for obsolescence, but did object to the deval-
uation of excess inventory.
In addition, Thor utilized the so-called "reserve-method" for
claiming losses from bad debts. In computing the addition to its re-
serve for the taxable year 1965, the collectibility of all accounts receiva-
ble was estimated by Thor personnel. All inter-company accounts were
treated as fully collectible. A 100 per cent reserve was established for
certain accounts estimated to be wholly uncollectible. Lesser percent-
age reserve accounts were created for other receivables, again based on
estimates of collectibility.
The Commissioner, upon audit of Thor's corporate income tax re-
turns, disagreed with these accounting practices, claiming in part that
the "write-downs" of Thor's inventory (other than inventory "written
down" with respect to obsolete parts and accessories) did not clearly
reflect Thor's income for federal income tax purposes.94 The Commis-
sioner also found that Thor's method of estimating bad debts was not
reasonable. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, even though it
agreed that Thor's "write-downs" of excess inventory constituted a
"best accounting practice" within the meaning of Code section 471.
The Tax Court determined that Thor had failed to establish that its
93. 563 F.2d at 864.
94. Id. at 865.
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inventory accounting clearly reflected its income in 1964 for federal in-
come tax purposes. The Tax Court held that the Commissioner did
not abuse the discretion vested in him under Code section 471 in mak-
ing his determination that the inventory "write-downs" did not clearly
reflect Thor's income, thus raising the "clearly reflecting income" con-
cept above that of "best accounting practice."
In affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit
initially analyzed Code sections 446 and 471 in order to determine
whether the Commissioner had abused the discretion vested in him
when he determined that Thor had to utilize another method of ac-
counting in order to clearly reflect its income. Code section 446 pro-
vides that taxes shall be computed in accordance with the taxpayer's
usual method of accounting unless that method does not clearly reflect
income.95 Although the Seventh Circuit noted that the taxpayer's
method of accounting normally is given preference, it also found that
the Commissioner may require another method of accounting if the
method used by the taxpayer does not clearly reflect income.96 The
court further noted that Code section 471 gives even greater discretion
to the Commissioner with respect to inventory accounting, by establish-
ing a bipartite standard on which the Commissioner may act: the tax-
payer's inventory method must both conform closely to the relevant
"best accounting practices" and also must clearly reflect income.
Citing Arinell Co. v. Commissioner97 and Brown v. Hevering,98 the
Seventh Circuit held that, in order to overturn the Commissioner's dis-
allowance, Thor was required to show that the Commissioner's act was
"plainly arbitrary." 99  This was because the issue "whether a given
method of accounting clearly reflects income" is one of fact1°° to be
decided by the Tax Court. Accordingly, the issue could be reviewed
by a circuit court of appeals only if the Commissioner's exercise of dis-
cretion was clearly erroneous. Consistent with this role, the Seventh
Circuit then found that Thor had not shown that the Commissioner's
act was "plainly arbitrary." The court dismissed Thor's argument that
95. I.R.C. §§ 446(a), 446(b).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1957) provides in relevant part that: "Each taxpayer shall
adopt such forms and systems as are, in his judgment, best suited to his needs. However, no
method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects
income."
97. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968) (whether a given method of accounting clearly reflects in-
come is a question of fact).
98. 291 U.S. 193 (1934) (when reviewing the Commissioner's exercise of discretion, it is not
the role of the appellate courts to weigh and determine the relative merits of systems of account-
ing).
99. 563 F.2d at 866.
100. Id.
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the Tax Court erred in not allowing Thor to take advantage of the
"presumption" that best accounting practice will clearly reflect income.
The court noted that the sentence in the Treasury Regulations utilized
as authority by Thor later had been repealed' 0' and that in all events
such a "presumption" was weakened by a preceding sentence in the
regulations which required consistency in inventory practice to clearly
reflect income. 0 2
The Seventh Circuit also found that the Commissioner had not
been "plainly arbitrary" in disallowing a portion of Thor's addition to
its bad debt reserve. The court found that Code section 166(c) clearly
permits the Commissioner to exercise his discretion regarding the rea-
sonableness of any particular addition to a bad debt reserve. 0 3 As
with the "write-down" of inventory issue, Thor was required to show
that the Commissioner abused his discretion in order to overturn the
Commissioner's disallowance in this context. Since the Commissioner
utilized a formula for computing a reasonable bad debt reserve as set
forth in Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, °4 the Commissioner's
method of determining the reserve for bad debts, which gave prefer-
ence to experience over estimates, was held to be reasonable.
The Seventh Circuit did not look at the economic realities of
Thor's accounting methods. The factual issue had been decided in the
Tax Court and the only question actually before the Seventh Circuit
was whether the Commissioner's position was "reasonable." Despite
certain equities in favor of the taxpayer, Thor apparently was not able
to deny the reasonableness of the Commissioner's findings. Given the
broad grant of administrative discretion from Congress to the Commis-
sioner, 05 the decision in Thor Power Tool Co. by the Seventh Circuit is
not surprising.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(b), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 165 (1973).
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(b), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163.
103. I.R.C. § 166(c) provides:
(c) Reserve for Bad Debts.
In lieu of any deduction under subsection (a), there shall be allowed (in the discre-
tion of the Secretary [or his delegate]) a deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve
for bad debts.
104. 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), afl'don other grounds, 125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942) (supporting the
Commissioner's method of computing reasonable annual additions to a taxpayer's bad debt re-
serve. The calculation is a percentage, generally computed by dividing average bad debts of the
taxpayer for the preceding six year period by the aggregate receivables owed the taxpayer during
the period).
105. See note 103, supra.
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TAX PROCEDURE: TIMELY FILING
In Lewin v. Commissioner,'°6 the Seventh Circuit on January 12,
1978 issued a per curiam decision which adopted the memorandum
opinion of the Tax Court. The issue in Lewin was whether the require-
ments of Code section 6212107 for mailing statutory notices of defi-
ciency' 08 had been met by the Commissioner. Although the Seventh
Circuit decided that the Commissioner had no duty to act beyond the
narrow requirements of the governing statute, the court nevertheless
examined the realities of the situation before making its determination.
The case arose from the certified mailing by the District Director
of Internal Revenue on June 18, 1973 of a statutory notice of deficiency
of income tax for the years 1966-68 to the taxpayers. The envelope
was addressed to the taxpayers at their last known address, as required
by Code section 6212. On June 19, 1973, the mail carrier attempted to
hand deliver the notice to the taxpayers at their home. Receiving no
answer, the mail carrier left a postal service form indicating the at-
tempted delivery in the taxpayers' mailbox. On June 29, 1973, a sec-
ond notice of attempted delivery also was placed in the taxpayers'
mailbox. The envelope containing the statutory notice of deficiency
was returned to the District Director on July 10, 1973, unopened and
marked "unclaimed." On October 1, 1973, the taxpayers received a
notification of a tax assessment and a demand for payment. The tax-
payers' attorney eventually secured a copy of the notice, which the tax-
payers saw for the first time on February 1, 1974. The taxpayers then
attempted to contest the deficiency by filing a petition in the Tax Court.
The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, asserting that the statutory deadline for filing a petition in
106. 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1978), affgper curtain, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,355 (1976), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 3090 (1978).
107. I.R.C. § 6212 in relevant part reads:
(a) In general
If the Secretary determines that there is a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed
by subtitle A or B or chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44, he is authorized to send notice of such
deficiency to the taxpayer by cerpted mail or registered mail.(b) Address for notice of deficiency
(1) Income and gift taxes and taxes imposed by chapter 42
In the absence of notice to the Secretary under section 6903 of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship, notice of a deficiency in respect of a tax imposed by subtitle A,
chapter 12, chapter 41, chapter 42, chapter 43, or chapter 44 if mailed to the taxpayer at
his last known address, shall be sufficient for purposes of subtitle A, chapter 12, chapter
41, chapter 42, chapter 43, chapter 44, and this chapter even if such taxpayer is deceased,
or is under a legal disability, or, in the case of a corporation, has terminated its existence.(Emphasis added.)
108. A "statutory notice of deficiency" is the notice referred to in Code section 6212 and repre-
sents the Commissioner's formal notification to a taxpayer of a determination by the Commis-
sioner of a tax deficiency. [The statutory notice of deficiency hereinafter will be referred to as the
notice.]
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the Tax Court had not been met by the taxpayers, since their petition
had been filed more than ninety days after the date the notice had been
sent by certified mail.109 The taxpayers contended that since the Com-
missioner failed to attempt further delivery prior to the expiration of
the filing deadline, the ninety day period should begin to run from the
date they actually received the notice."10
In holding that the taxpayers had missed the deadline for filing a
petition, the Tax Court relied on Pfeffer v. Commissioner. " I I In Pfeffer
the court held that as a general rule the ninety day period begins with
the mailing date of the notice, regardless of the date of actual receipt by
the taxpayer. The Tax Court held that there were no circumstances in
Lewin to warrant relaxation of the specific statutory language.
The Seventh Circuit's three paragraph per curiam opinion in
Lewin adopted in full the Tax Court's memorandum decision since
there was no precedent on point in the Seventh Circuit and since the
Tax Court had reached the correct result for the correct reasons. The
Tax Court's decision, as adopted by the Seventh Circuit, is consistent
with the Seventh Circuit's non-technical interpretation of the tax law
during the past term when not confronted with controlling precedent.
Although the statute in question appears to be dispositive of the issue at
hand, it was not mentioned by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion. Only
at the end of the Tax Court opinion did the court make reference to the
technical wording of the statute;" t2 instead the opinion was based on
the equities of the specific circumstances giving rise to the issue." 13
MARITAL DEDUCTION EQUALIZATION CLAUSES
During the last term, the Seventh Circuit was faced with one fed-
eral estate tax case, Estate of Smith v. Commissioner. 114 On November
3, 1977, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court."15
109. I.R.C. § 6213.
110. The taxpayer relied on Estate fMcKaig v. Commisioner, 51 T.C. 331 (1968), for the
proposition that the narrow requirements of Code section 6212 could be waived under exceptional
circumstances. Narrowly construed, that case held that a mailing of a notice was not completed
when the postal service crossed out the correct address on the envelope, inserted a new incorrect
address and then returned the letter to the Commissioner as "unclaimed."
111. 272 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1959).
112. I.R.C. § 6212.
113. The Seventh Circuit made the additional comment in its per curiam opinion that the
taxpayer still had an adequate avenue to contest the notice by paying the tax and then instituting a
refund suit in federal district court. 569 F.2d at 445 (relying on Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931); Brown v. Lethert, 360 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1966); Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d
760 (9th Cit. 1962)).
114. 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), aflgper curiam 66 T.C. 415 (1976).
115. It is noteworthy that, after the Seventh Circuit decision, the Commissioner announced
that he will not acquiesce to the Tax Court decision in Estate of Smith. 1978-21 I.R.B. 6. Al-
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This decision was one of the few tax decisions during the last term
which the Seventh Circuit decided in favor of the taxpayer. A close
examination of the underlying rationale indicates again that the Sev-
enth Circuit emphasized the substance of the transaction rather than
the form or literal rules of the applicable tax law." 16
The issue arose after the death of Charles W. Smith in 1970. His
taxable estate was owned primarily by a revocable inter vivos trust
which the decedent had established in 1967 with a corporate fiduciary
as trustee. The trust agreement provided that upon Smith's death the
trust assets were to be divided into two portions.
The first portion constituted the marital portion and was to be held
as a separate trust designed to qualify for the federal estate tax marital
deduction."t 7  Pursuant to the terms of the trust, the decedent's surviv-
ing spouse would receive all of the net income during her lifetime and
would possess a general power of appointment exercisable at her
death." 1 8
The portion of the original revocable trust which was not allocated
to the marital portion constituted the residual portion. The residual
portion was not intended to qualify for the federal estate tax marital
deduction but, unlike the marital portion, would not be includable in
the surviving spouse's estate on her later death. The division of a dece-
dent's estate into two portions, one intended to qualify for the maxi-
mum federal estate tax marital deduction and the other intended to
exclude the maximum amount of assets from the surviving spouse's
subsequent taxable estate, is a commonly utilized estate planning tech-
nique.
The allocation language in the trust agreement with respect to de-
termining the appropriate marital portion was contained in a so-called
though the Commissioner may be required to follow the Estate of Smith decision in the Seventh
Circuit despite his non-acquiescence, undoubtedly the issue will arise in other United States
Courts of Appeals and ultimately may be decided by the Supreme Court. The fact that the non-
acquiescence was issued after the date of the Seventh Circuit decision reflects that the Commis-
sioner intends to litigate the issue.
116. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1).
117. See I.R.C. § 2056. The marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes allows the value
of qualified property passing to a decedent's surviving spouse to be deductible against the dece-
dent's "adjusted gross estate," subject to a limitation of the greater of $250,000 or one-half the
value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(I)(A). At the date of the dece-
dent's death in Estate of Smith, however, the marital deduction was limited to the value of one-
half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate as determined for federal estate tax purposes. I.R.C. §
2056(c)(1)(A) (amended 1976).
118. Although the trust estate did not pass outright to the surviving spouse and might consti-
tute a "terminable interest" (see I.R.C. § 2056(b)), such an interest expressly qualifies for the
federal estate tax marital deduction pursuant to Code section 2056(b)(5).
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"equalization clause."' 19 Instead of simply qualifying the marital por-
tion for the maximum marital deduction with respect to the decedent's
estate, the equalization clause in the Smith Trust required the trustee to
allocate an amount to the marital portion which would result in the
lowest federal estate taxes for both the decedent's estate and the dece-
dent's wife's estate, assuming that the decedent's wife survived the de-
cedent. In addition to computing the value of both estates in order to
determine the appropriate allocation for the marital portion, the trustee
had the power to select as the valuation date for the determination ei-
ther the date of the decedent's death or the alternate valuation date 20
in order to produce the greatest overall tax savings. The clause stated
that it was the decedent's purpose "to equalize, insofar as possible, his
estate and her estate for federal tax purposes, based upon said assump-
tions."121
The Commissioner took the position that the equalization clause
caused the property interest passing from the decedent to his wife,
through the trust, to be a "terminable interest" as defined under Code
section 2056(b)(1)122 and that, accordingly, the marital portion did not
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction. The "terminable
interest" rule states that an interest in property passing to (or for the
benefit of) the surviving spouse of a decedent will not qualify for the
marital deduction if, on account of the lapse of time or occurrence or
failure to occur of any contingency, the interest passing to the surviving
spouse would terminate or fail, such that the property interest then
119. See 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1294 (Supp. 1977) for a discussion of the marital
deduction.
120. Pursuant to Code section 2032, there is an elective alternate valuation date for valuing a
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, which now is six months after the date of
the decedent's death, but was one year after the date of the decedent's death in Estate ofSmith.
I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1) (amended 1976).
121. 66 T.C. at 418.
122. I.R.C. § 2056(b) in relevant part reads as follows:
(b) Limitation in the case of life estate or other terminable interest.
(1) General rule
Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or
on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving
spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this section with re-
spect to such an interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any
person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may pos-
sess or enjoy any part of such property such termination or failure of the interest so
passing to te surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if such deduction is
not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))-
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to direc-
tions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust.
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would pass to another person. 23 The Commissioner's position was
that, theoretically at least, it was possible for no property to pass under
the marital portion for the benefit of Smith's surviving spouse. If both
estates were exactly equal in size at the date of the decedent's death,
then appropriate equalization would mean that no additional property
would be utilized to fund the marital portion, since transferring addi-
tional property would result in inequality between the two estates.
Moreover, since the trustee could use the alternate valuation date in
making the determination, the amount of the interest, if any, passing to
the marital portion was uncertain on the date of the decedent's
death. 124
The Tax Court, however, disagreed with the Commissioner's posi-
tion and did not view the "equalization clause" as one which deter-
mined whether any property would pass to the decedent's surviving
spouse. Instead, the Tax Court considered the clause as simply a
mechanism for determining the value of the property interest passing to
the surviving spouse. In holding that an interest is not terminable
under the "terminable interest rule" simply because the value or quan-
tity thereof cannot be determined as of the date of the decedent's death,
the Tax Court concluded that the interest here, if any and as finally
determined, would qualify for the marital deduction. 125 For example,
if the equalization formula required the trustee to allocate nothing to
the marital portion, then the value of the decedent's surviving spouse's
interest in the trust would be zero and the decedent's estate would not
be allowed a marital deduction.
Judge Irwin of the Tax Court dissented, 26 finding that technically
the "equalization clause" made the spouse's interest terminable and
therefore insufficient to qualify for the marital deduction. The dissent
reached its conclusion reluctantly, since neither the purpose of the mar-
ital deduction statute nor the terminable interest rule itself would have
been frustrated by allowing the deduction. 127 Nevertheless, the dissent
believed that such a decision was the natural consequence of the literal
requirements of the statute.
123. 66 T.C. at 423-24.
124. The Commissioner's argument in this respect seems to be somewhat attenuated, since the
decedent's personal representative could in all events elect the alternate valuation date for valuing
the estate and calculating the value of the marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2032(a). Further, Code
section 2056(b)(3) in general provides that an interest passing from a decedent to his surviving
spouse may be conditioned on the surviving spouse's subsequent survival for a limited period of
time, not to exceed six months, still qualifying for the marital deduction and without violating the
terminable interest rule. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(3).
125. 66 T.C. at 428.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Id. at 436.
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The Seventh Circuit, in agreeing with the majority of the Tax
Court, also held that the remote possibility that Mrs. Smith would re-
ceive nothing from the equalization clause bequest was only a question
of the value of the interest and not a question of whether the interest
existed. Describing the Commissioner's position as "hidebound,"'' 28
the Seventh Circuit felt that it was impossible to distinguish between a
so-called "fractional share bequest," which qualifies for the marital de-
duction even though the precise value of the fractional share cannot be
known until subsequent events occur, 129 and an equalization clause of
the type in Smith. After distinguishing Jackson v. United States,130
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the equalization clause in Smith
operated to determine a fixed property interest, although one that was
subject to a valuation determination occurring after the date of the de-
cedent's death.
The Seventh Circuit also stressed the equities involved in holding
for the taxpayer, by concluding that there was no possibility that the
property interest passing to Mrs. Smith would escape taxation alto-
gether.13' Although it is true that a property interest qualifying for the
marital deduction under most circumstances eventually would be in-
eluded in the estate of the surviving spouse, it would have been possible
for the marital portion funds to escape estate taxation if spent during
Mrs. Smith's lifetime. In all events, property qualifying for the marital
deduction provides a deferral of the estate tax (in this instance from the
date of Mr. Smith's death to the later date of Mrs. Smith's death). To
the extent that the tax liability is deferred there is a savings generated
by the "use value" of money which indirectly would escape taxation in
this instance.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Commissioner conceded
many of the relevant issues. He admitted that the equalization clause
is not a "tax avoidance measure,"' 32 because estate taxes still would
128. 565 F.2d at 458.
129. See 66 T.C. at 431 n.23 (citing R.B. COVEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF
FORMULA PROVISIONS (1966)).
130. 376 U.S. 503 (1964) (an allowance provided by California law for the support of a widow
during the settlement of her husband's estate constituted a terminable interest). The facts in
Jackson were distinguished from those in Estate of Smith, because the widow's allowance in
Jackson was a "creature of state law" which the state courts had held did not vest at the date of
the husband's death, but rather "related back" to the husband's death. 565 F.2d at 459. Appar-
ently in Estate ofSmith the equalization clause was considered to have created a property interest
that did "vest" at the date of the husband's death and only the calculation of that interest "related
back."
131. 565 F.2d at 459.
132. Id. at 457. At least in Estate of Smith it appears likely that federal estate tax was col-
lected with respect to the marital portion property upon Mrs. Smith's subsequent death. 66 T.C.
at 429 n.21.
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be collected from the estate of each spouse and none of the funds
would escape taxation. The Commissioner's counsel admitted during
oral argument that there were no policy grounds for vitiating the equal-
ization clause. 133 As a consequence, the Commissioner's position was
simply that the literal language of Code section 2056(b) required dis-
qualification of the interest for the marital deduction, a particularly
harsh result by any standard. Although the line between an interest in
property and the value of that interest may be a fine one to draw, the
equities and realities of the case lend support for the Seventh Circuit's
affirmation of the Tax Court decision.
DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INSURANCE COMPANY
Unlike Smith, where the Commissioner desired a literal reading of
the relevant tax statute and lost before the Seventh Circuit, in Allied
Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner 34 the Commissioner desired a broad
reading of a different provision in the tax law and won. In Allied
Fidelity, the Seventh Circuit on March 23, 1978, issued a technical de-
cision which again illustrates the court's search for the underlying sub-
stance of the tax controversy. The issue presented was whether a
wholly owned subsidiary of the taxpayer, Allied Fidelity Insurance
Corp., was entitled to be classified for federal income tax purposes as
an "insurance company" under Code sections 831 and 832. Despite
the narrowness of the issue, the decision reflects the Seventh Circuit's
probing of the economic substance, rather than only the form, of tax
transactions. The court's positions in both Smith and Allied are en-
tirely consistent, although one might question whether the Commis-
sioner's tax philosophy in the two cases was equally consistent. 35
Allied Fidelity Insurance Corp. was engaged in the business of
writing fidelity and surety bonds in addition to automobile insurance
contracts. A major portion of Allied's business was writing surety bail
contracts. Its articles of incorporation were amended during 1972 to
permit Allied to insure a wide range of casualties and other risks.
Since its incorporation, Allied filed annual statements with the insur-
ance regulatory authorities in those states in which it was authorized to
133. Id. at 458.
134. 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978), affig 66 T.C. 1068 (1976).
135. In fairness to the Commissioner, his apparently inconsistent philosophies as reflected in
Allied and Smith may be consistent or at least justifiable. In Allied, the relevant statute did not
contain any definition of the term "insurance company" and the Commissioner desired a broad
interpretation of the term; in Smith, the relevant statute contained a specific definition of a "termi-
nable interest" and the Commissioner desired a literal construction. In addition to the possible
inference of different Congressional intent, Allied was an income tax case and Smith was an estate
tax case.
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do business and was subject to regulation. Allied's tax accounting
techniques were consistent with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples for insurance companies.
The Commissioner determined that Allied did not qualify as an
"insurance company" during the taxable years in question. As a con-
sequence, the Commissioner determined that Allied's accounting pro-
cedures for tax purposes were not appropriate and that Allied was not
entitled to tax benefits available only to insurance companies.' 36
Therefore, the Commissioner assessed a tax deficiency against Allied
for 1971 and 1972.
Treasury Regulation section 1.831-1(a) defines the term "insurance
company" by reference to the definition in the Treasury Regulations
issued under Code section 801, which in relevant part reads:
Though its name, charter powers, and subjection to state insurance
laws are significant in determining the business which a corporation
is authorized and intends to carry on, the character of the business
actually done in the taxable year determines whether it is taxable as
an insurance company under the Code.' 37
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court decision in Allied
Fidelity, admitted that Allied's name included the word insurance and
that the company's corporate charter and corporate authority were spe-
cifically founded upon and governed by the Indiana Insurance Law. ' 38
Nevertheless, the court noted that the cumulative result of a series of
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the 1920's and
1930's' 39 and the plain language of the regulation'O required that the
"character of the business actually done" determine whether the tax-
payer is an "insurance company" under the Code.
The court therefore analyzed the nature of the bail system and
how it relates to the characteristics of an insurance contract in order to
determine the "character of the business actually done" by Allied. The
Seventh Circuit perceived Allied's role in issuing criminal bail con-
tracts as not an economic one in the nature of issuing insurance. The
court came to this conclusion because, unlike insurance, a forfeiture
payment by Allied would not make the state whole and fully compen-
136. While the normal federal corporate tax rates are applicable to insurance companies, the
taxable income of certain insurance companies is computed under special rules contained in Code
sections 831 and 832, including special deductions with respect to capital losses and loss carry-
overs. See I.R.C. §§ 831 and 832.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-1 (b)(2) (1978).
138. IND. CODE §§ 27-1-2-1 to 27-1-20-32 (1971).
139. United States v. Home Title Ins. Co., 285 U.S. 191 (1932); Bowers v. Lawyers Home
Mortgage Co., 285 U.S. 182 (1932); and United States v. Cambridge Loan and Bldg. Co., 278 U.S.
55 (1928).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-1(b)(2) (1978).
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sated for its loss (since the state could only be made whole by the
recapture of the accused). The court stated: "From Allied's position as
surety, the transaction may appear to be essentially a pecuniary one but
• . .the loss to the state by an accused fleeing, which is the 'risk' to the
state, may be societal, legal, or moral but certainly is not merely a pecu-
niary one."' 41 Allied's surety contracts were determined to be more in
the nature of contracts to perform services (that is, to produce the de-
fendants) than in the nature of contracts of insurance.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the taxpayer's assertion that, under
the doctrine of Helvering v. LeGierse, 42 Allied was engaged in the in-
surance business because its surety bail contracts involved "risk shift-
ing" and "risk distributing." The court concluded that the "risk" was
not distributed among all of Allied's customers by virtue of its premi-
ums and that the "risk" of an accused failing to appear for trial was not
shifted fully from the state to Allied. 143
While the Allied Fidelity decision appears to be of little signifi-
cance to most taxpayers, it is a prime example of the search by the
Seventh Circuit to discern the underlying economic substance of the
actions of the parties. As such, the decision is consistent with a large
number of the tax cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during the last
term.
In conclusion, the last term was one in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided several tax cases of
significance, although most of the decisions involved technical provi-
sions of the Code or issues of limited applicability to taxpayers in gen-
eral. The number of affirmations may reflect the soundness of the
decisions by the federal district courts and the Tax Court, undoubtedly
making the task of the Seventh Circuit an easier one.
An examination of the tax decisions of the Seventh Circuit indi-
cates the difficulties confronted by a non-specialized court when re-
quired to interpret a highly technical statute, often without guidance in
the form of intelligible statutory language or controlling precedent.
The Seventh Circuit has accomplished an admirable task in this regard.
Such an undertaking cannot be simple and the task is complicated by
the court's perceived need to base its tax decisions on the equities and
141. 572 F.2d at 1193.
142. 312 U.S. 531 (1941) (analyzing certain types of life insurance contracts and concluding
that they involved "risk shifting" and "risk distributing").
143. 572 F.2d at 1194.
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economic realities of the cases before it. A review of last term's tax
decisions indicates an emphasis by the Seventh Circuit on such reali-
ties, perhaps with less emphasis upon the technical requirements of the
law but nevertheless with a skillful attempt at reconciling tax realities
and tax technicalities. If the results are not entirely consistent, it may
be that the fault is with the Code and not with the judicial craftsman-
ship of the Seventh Circuit.
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